According to Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology, a report p u blished by t h e D e p a r t m e n t of D e f e n s e ( D O D ) last year, information gleaned from scientific c o n f e r e n c e s in t h e W e s t h a s c o n t r i b u t e d substantially to the success of t h e Soviet military-industrial m a n u f a c t u ring base. It says the Soviets e s t i m a t e that data picked up at s o m e 35 targeted conferences in the late 1970s and early 1980s "produced savings of millions of rubles in l o n g -r a n g e military r e s e a r c h projectssavings roughly equivalent to 100 m a nyears of effort." Moreover, the D O D report s a y s , " T h e fact that n u m e r o u s professional and scientific conferences are specifically identified as valuable sources in advance by the VPK indicates their exploitation is not f o r t u i t o u s , but carefully planned."
D O D c o n s i d e r s t h e VPK, o r S o v i e t Military Industrial C o m m i s s i o n , to be the most powerful o r g a n i z a t i o n in the Soviet d e f e n s e -r e s e a r c h e s t a b l i s h m e n t . It says VPK n o t only c o o r d i n a t e s d e v e l o p m e n t of all Soviet w e a p o n s b u t also t h e nationallevel Soviet p r o g r a m to acquire W e s t e r n t e c h n o l o g y .
T h e U.S. intelligence c o mm u n i t y believes m a n y if not most of the r o u g h l y 2,000 Soviet Bloc scientists and e n g i n e e r s on p r o f e s s i o n a l visits to t h e United S t a t e s each year probably a t t e m p t to fulfill high-priority VPK r e q u i r e m e n t s . Each such r e q u i r e m e n t is a d o c u m e n t , piece of h a r d w a r e , or set of data specifically t a r g e t e d forcollection. According to D O D , t h e Soviet A c a d e m y of Sciences, S t a t e C o m m i t t e e for Science and Technology, ( C K N T ) and State C o m m i t t e e for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES) all c o n t r i b u t e to m e e t i n g VPK's stated " r e q u i r e m e n t s " t h r o u g h the directives they give researchers before sending t h e m into the West to a t t e n d conferences o r to participate in cooperative exchanges.
In an e f f o r t t o t h w a r t w h a t D O D describes as the West's "subsidizing" of the Soviet military buildup, the Reagan administration has since 1980 stepped up meas u r e s to c o n t r o l the c o m m u n i c a t i o n of much science and technical data in disciplines deemed "militarily critical." While m o s t U.S. scientists do not object to the motives driving the g o v e r n m e n t ' s clamp d o w n , m a n y are n o n e t h e l e s s concerned a b o u t the negative effects this p r o g r a m has had on both individual scientists and scientific societies. In particular, they object that e x t e n s i v e restrictions are being placed on a c c e s s t o u n c l a s s i f i e d i n f o r m a t i o ninformation that until recently has largely been freely c o m m u n i c a t e d within the international research c o m m u n i t y . M a n y scientists and research societies have b e g u n a r g u i n g s t r e n u o u s l y t h a t by placing limits on the e x c h a n g e of scientific and engin e e r i n g information, the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t may i n a d v e r t e n t l y stifle innovation, and in so doing, jeopardize national security.
As t h e A m e r i c a n P h y s i c a l S o c i e t y ' s R o b e r t L. Park said in t e s t i m o n y before an A u g u s t 11 S e n a t e Foreign Relations S u bc o m m i t t e e h e a r i n g on free trade in ideas: " O n e has only to look at o u r political adversaries to w i t n e s s the effect of g o v e r nm e n t r e s t r a i n t s . Soviet biology trails far behind that of the West, largely as a result of years of official s u p p o r t for the discredited genetic theories of Lysenko. Solids t a t e electronics in the Soviet Union has n e v e r fully recovered from the official decision to stress g e r m a n i u m -b a s e d technology over silicon-based. It is hard to believe that these decisions could have long persisted in an a t m o s p h e r e of free discussion." It's u n f o r t u n a t e , he said, but "at times the U.S. s e e m s intent on e m u l a t i n g the Soviet Union's failed system by careless application of e x p o r t control laws to t h e transfer of information."
In a letter to Defense S e c r e t a r y C a s p a r W e i n b e r g e r last year, the p r e s i d e n t s of 12 scientific and e n g i n e e r i n g societies voiced their objections to m a n y of these n e w c o n t r o l s , especially to w h a t they t e r m e d D O D ' s de facto i m p o s i t i o n of a n e w c a t e g o r y of classification-one that limits publication of affected unclassi-fied data to a limited audience, usually o n e consisting of U.S. residents only. A r g u i n g that such a classification r u n s c o u n t e r to the principal missions of their o r g a n i z a t i o n s , the presid e n t s vowed their g r o u p s "will not be responsible for, nor will t h e y s p o n s o r , closed or restricted access technical sessions at meetings or conferences conducted u n d e r their auspices." "[T]he U.S. scientific and technical e n t e rprise has been battered in the past several years by actions and t h r e a t s of actions on the g o v e r n m e n t ' s part to s u p p r e s s the n o r m a l disclosure of unclassified findings," according to William D. C a r e y , executive officer of the A m e r i c a n Association for the A d v a n c e m e n t of Science (AAAS). In congressional t e s t i m o n y this past s u m m e r he noted t h a t " o p e n scientific and technical conferences have been interfered with rep e a t e d l y and o b n o x i o u s l y , h u n d r e d s of prepared papers have been s e q u e s t e r e d , scientists have been w a r n e d to clean up their act o r face severe penalties, u n i v e rsities have been pressured to exercise surveillance o v e r foreign s t u d e n t s , and p u blishers of journals have had to walk a t i g h t r o p e in trying to judge w h e t h e r o r not a technical discussion c o n t a i n s s o m e t h i n g t h a t will strike s o m e g o v e r n m e n t functionary as r e q u i r i n g a n e x p o r t license." T h e result, he said, is that " | t ] h e r e is a lot of intimidation in the a t m o s p h e r e , and it is d r i v i n g s o m e of o u r b e s t g o v e r n m e n t , i n d u s t r i a l , and u n i v e r s i t y s c i e n t i s t s to decline to discuss their w o r k at conferences of their peers."
National Security Decision Directive 189
T h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , mindful of t h e s e a r g u m e n t s by influential scientists and societies, has s o u g h t to appease the r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t y -i n part, by eliminating some of the u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t which p r o g r a m s will be subject to controls. For instance, on S e p t e m b e r 2 1 , 1 9 8 5 , President R e a g a n signed a d i r e c t i v e e s t a b l i s h i n g White H o u s e policy on the e x t e n t to which certain nonclassified research data could be controlled.
According to that National Security Decision Directive ( N S D D ) 1 8 9 :
"It is the policy of this a d m i n i s t r a t i o n that, to the m a x i m u m e x t e n t possible, the p r o d u c t s of f u n d a m e n t a l research remain u n r e s t r i c t e d . It is also the policy of this administration that, w h e r e the national security requires control, the m e c h a n i s m for control of information g e n e r a t e d d u r i n g federally funded fundamental research in science, technology and e n g i n e e r i n g at colleges, universities and laboratories is classification. Each federal g o v e r n m e n t agency is responsible for: (a) d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r classification is a p p r o p r i a t e prior to t h e a w a r d of a research g r a n t , contract, or cooperative a g r e e m e n t and, if so, controlling the research results t h r o u g h s t a n d a r d classification p r o c e d u r e s ; (b) periodically reviewing all research g r a n t s , c o n t r a c t s , or c o o p e r a t i v e a g r e e m e n t s for p o t e n t i a l classification.
" N o restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or r e p o r t i n g of federally funded f u n d a m e n t a l research that has not received national security classification, except as provided in applicable U.S. s t a t u t e s . "
What is Fundamental Research?
A key to this policy is the definition of fundamental r e s e a r c h . G o v e r n m e n t g a t ek e e p e r s readily admit that w h a t o n e contract m a n a g e r may consider"applied"could appear quite " f u n d a m e n t a l " to a n o t h e r . In fact, n o t e s S t e p h e n B. G o u l d of the A A A S C o m m i t t e e on Scientific F r e e d o m a n d Responsibility, " T h e label ' f u n d a m e n t a l r e s e a r c h ' w a s not c o m m o n l y used as a descriptive term within the scientific and Continued e n g i n e e r i n g research c o m m u n i t y prior to releaseof I N S D D 189] i n d r a f t form in May 1984." Identifying " f u n d a m e n t a l -r e s e a r c h " p r o g r a m s is probably easiest within the National Science F o u n d a t i o n , because the agency uses that term as a b u d g e t category. In o t h e r funding agencies, w h e r e basic research is not so well e a r m a r k e d , cont r a c t o r s may have a m o r e difficult time assessing w h e t h e r their nonclassified work is subject to g o v e r n m e n t controls. M o r eover, N S D D 189 policy does not formally a d d r e s s w h e t h e r industrial c o n t r a c t w o r k or i n -h o u s e g o v e r n m e n t research should be judged by the s a m e s t a n d a r d .
The Policy at D O D
T o clarify this situation a m o n g the res e a r c h e r s it funds, the Air Force this year completed i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of a policy first articulated in 1983 by a D O D C o m m i t t e e o n N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y a n d T e c h n o l o g y T r a n s f e r . All nonclassified basic-research a n d e x p l o r a t o r y -d e v e l o p m e n t w o r kdesignated within D O D by the contract c a t e g o r y d e s i g n a t i o n s 6.1 and 6.2 respectively-is, w h e n performed in academia, open to u n r e s t r i c t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n , except as privacy and p r o p r i e t a r y (i.e. t r a d e secrets) considerations dictate. Similarly, all unclassified basic research-or6.1 workp e r f o r m e d for the Air Force e i t h e r within i n d u s t r y or within its service laboratories can n o w be shared t h r o u g h u n r e s t r i c t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n . What type of 6.2 p r o g r a m might acquire controls? Explains o n e official: If, in a w e a p o n s -d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m , a q u e s t i o n crops up a b o u t h o w o n e of the n e w materials to be used will behave, "we'll w a n t to j u m p back in and do a little bit m o r e s t u d y i n g of that material. This will be a 6.2 project. And if, in the course of doing that w o r k w e find w e ' r e likely to give a w a y h o w v u l n e r a b l e that w e a p o n might be in diff e r e n t e n v i r o n m e n t s , t h a t ' s w h e r e w e w o u l d w a n t to p u t a r e v i e w s i t u a t i o n [potential controlsl on to make s u r e that a n y t h i n g t h a t ' s published sticks to the basics of evaluating characteristics of the material-and not to its usefulness in the w e a p o n s s y s t e m . "
T o avoid s u r p r i s e s , the Air Force design a t e s to r e s e a r c h e r s w h e n a contract is signed w h e t h e r such controls may/will be in effect. W h e r e such a designation has not been made, the Air Force has pledged not to slap restrictions, after the fact, on the c o m m u n i c a t i o n of scientific or technical data from that work.
This
o w n l a b s -w h e t h e r t h e r e is any need to seek g o v e r n m e n t approval before they c o m m u n i c a t e any technical aspect of or data derived from their studies. T h o s e not w a r n e d of any c o n t r o l s at the c o n t r a c t signing are free to publish w o r k developed u n d e r t h a t c o n t r a c t a n y w h e r e , as long as t h e y s u b m i t a c o p y o f t h e i r p a p e r t o t h e A i r Force at the s a m e time. N o t e s one official, " W e c a n n o t restrict or w i t h d r a w |their papers s u b m i t t e d for publication]. All we can do is c o m m e n t . " Similarly, these res e a r c h e r s may discuss their w o r k at scientific conferences a t t e n d e d by foreign nationals-including Soviet Bloc colleaguesw i t h o u t g o v e r n m e n t approval. O t h e r D O D b r a n c h e s c u r r e n t l y abide by a similar t h o u g h s o m e w h a t m o r e restrictive policy. Nonclassified 6.1 research in academia or i n d u s t r y is still automatically g r a n t e d u n r e s t r
i c t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n privileges. A s m a l l n u m b e r o f 6 . 2 c o n t r a c t s w i t h universities and s o m e of those with industry will contain d e s i g n a t i o n s that the w o r k is o r may fall u n d e r e x p o r t c o n t r o l s . H o w e v e r , unless potential restrictions are n e g o t i a t e d at t h e t i m e of a c o n t r a c t ' s signing, D O D will put no controls on the c o m m u n i c a t i o n of or data from this n o nclassified 6.1 or 6.2 work.

For research p e r f o r m e d at o t h e r t h a n Air Force D O D labs, t h e situation is less clear.
M o s t services have set their o w n policy, the g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e being t h a t e v e r y t h i n g a g o v e r n m e n t e m p l o y e e w r i t e s for public distribution should be reviewed.
H o w e v e r , s u c h r e v i e w s m a y be for m a t t e r s o t h e r t h a n national-security considerations, including e x p o r t controls. For example, they may be to screen material for s t a t e m e n t s at odds with official agency doctrine or policy. T h e D e p u t y U n d e r s e c r etary of Defense for Research and Advanced T e c h n o l o g y is said to be considering ext e n d i n g the m o r e liberal Air Force policy to cover Navy and A r m y research as well. While agency officials acknowledge such a m o v e t o w a r d u n i f y i n g D O D policy is possible, they add t h a t the subject's relatively low priority virtually a s s u r e s t h e r e will be no formal action on it any time soon.
DOE's N e w Program
T h e D e p a r t m e n t of Energy (DOE) estim a t e s t h a t each y e a r h u n d r e d s of its c o n t r a c t scientists and e n g i n e e r s are subtly plied for data -m u c h of it unclassified-by S o v i e t c o l l e a g u e s a t t e m p t i n g to fulfill VPK's r e q u i r e m e n t s . C o n c e r n e d that its c o n t r a c t e m p l o y e e s in unclassified p r og r a m s a r e i n a d v e r t a n t l y s h a r i n g m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n with t h e s e Eastern Bloc coll e a g u e s t h a n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d e e m s wise, D O E has targeted a massive " e d uc a t i o n " c a m p a i g n . Said o n e D O E official, " W e ' r e trying to p u t the fear of God into s o m e of o u r people." T h e agency hopes that doing so will m a k e its r e s e a r c h e r s m o r e c i r c u m s p e c t a b o u t the type and q u a n t i t y of unclassified research data they s h a r e with Soviet colleagues at i n t e r n a t i o n a l meetings and d u r i n g e x c h a n g e p r o g r a m s .
In explaining t h e p r o g r a m , the D O E official n o t e d t h a t m a n y scientists cond u c t i n g unclassified basic research for the agency a r e n ' t a w a r e t h a t t h e i r labors involve or risk encroaching on disciplines m e n t i o n e d in the Militarily Critical Technologies List ( M C T L ) . T h a t ' s not necessarily surprising since the M C T L and the justification for listed technologies are both classified. M o r e o v e r , unlike D O D , D O E has not m a d e it a practice to identify in its c o n t r a c t s with r e s e a r c h e r s w h e t h e r information coming out of or relating tocontract w o r k will be subject to e x p o r t controls. Adding still f u r t h e r to the confusion is the fact t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e p r o g r a m is o s t e nsibly designed to be c o n s i s t e n t with N S D D 189 policy, t h e r e is no o n e operational definition of w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s f u n d a m e n t a l r e s e a r c h . In fact, o n e a g e n c y s e c u r i t y official noted that t h e r e are probably at l e a s t 10 d i f f e r e n t d e f i n i t i o n s f l o a t i n g a r o u n d D O E . N o n e t h e l e s s , the agency feels it's i m p o r t a n t to indicate to s o m e researchers t h a t as their investigations m a t u r e , discussion of p r o g r a m details and data may violate e x p o r t -c o n t r o l laws.
A l t h o u g h D O E ' s n e w p r o g r a m will initially focus on agency c o n t r a c t o r s at the national laboratories, the agency intends to eventually expand it to e n c o m p a s s outside c o n t r a c t w o r k e r s as well. T h e p r o g r a m was i n a u g u r a t e d in February at Lawrence Liverm o r e National Laboratory, with an antiespionage campaign k n o w n as SAFE-for S e c u r i t y A w a r e n e s s for Employees. It included talks on "You are the T a r g e t " by the d i r e c t o r of intelligence and c o u n t e r i n t e lligence p r o g r a m s for the U.S. National Security Council and by Soviet defectors.
Revisions to C o m m e r c e Department Export Rules
C o n g r e s s a m e n d e d the E x p o r t Adminis t r a t i o n Act in July 1985 to include n e w l a n g u a g e saying that: "It is the policy of the United S t a t e s to sustain vigorous scientific e n t e r p r i s e . T o do so involves sustaining the ability of scientists and o t h e r scholars freely to c o m m u n i c a t e research findings, in acc o r d a n c e with the applicable provisions of law, by m e a n s of publication, teaching, conferences, and o t h e r forms of scholarly e x c h a n g e . " Based on the Act's c h a n g e s , the C o m m e r c e D e p a r t m e n t proposed revisions to its E x p o r t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n R e g u l a t i o n s (EAR), which w e r e published in the May 16 federal Register. T h e y included the s a m e r o u g h definition for f u n d a m e n t a l research as a p p e a r s in N S D D 189:
"basic and applied research in science and e n g i n e e r i n g , the r e s u l t s of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific c o m m u n i t y , as dis-
Conlinued
tinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons."
They also state explicitly that university research "normally will be considered fundamental research." While that has pleased many academic research organizations, a subsidiary clause has not. It states that the general freedom to communicate fundamental-research findings may be withdrawn "if a university or its researchers accept specific national security controls on a research project or activity sponsored by the U.S. government." Several academic groups, including the Council on Governmental Relations (an organization of research universities), have objected to that phrase on the grounds that it appears to violate the policy set forth in NSDD 189-that only classified fundamental research is open to export controls.
In a July 15 letter to the agency, Mark Ryan, a senior attorney for HewlettPackard Co., objects to another ambiguous clause in the proposed EAR which says that unclassified fundamental research within industry may be freely communicated unless it is subject to proprietary or "national security considerations." What those national-security considerations might entail is never discussed. The Commerce Department is expected to formally address these and other contested EAR provisions later in the year.
Another Proposal to Limit Confusion
A proposed DOD directive published February 12 in the Federal Register attempts to resolve some of the remaining confusion. Not only does the new directive-expected to be issued in final form before the year's end-formally incorporate NSDD 189 policy, but it also formally states for the first time DOD's functional definition of fundamental research for the purposes of unrestricted scientific and technical communication-6.1 and 6.2 academic research, and 6.1 industrial research. (Until this time, DOD's evolving definition of fundamental research could only be discerned from various pieces of correspondence.) The directive also proposes formal changes to defense acquisition regulations-changes that make identification of fundamental research a contract requirement. Contracts so designated will require-in terms of publication accountability-only the simultaneous submission of papers to DOD when they are submitted to journals.
The new directive also sets target dates by which DOD will attempt to clear for publication papers that have been written by in-house researchers. Moreover, it identifies in broad terms who conference organizers should talk to within DOD when they plan scientific and technical meetings-both open (unrestricted) and closed (for U.S. residents only)-on sensitive subjects. Under U.S. federal export laws, it is the responsibility of an exporter to determine whether he/she needs to obtain a license. Explains one Defense Department official, "The State Department has no technical review capability, so it forwards papers [it receives] to DOD for advice. And they [the State Department] typically act on DOD's recommendation." A new provision in the directive would shorten the review cycle by allowing authors to submit their papers directly to DOD, instead of the State Department, for review. It reflects a deal whereby the State Department has agreed not to prosecute for export-control publication violations anyone whose work has received previous DOD clearance for public dissemination. More controversial is a provision the agency was in the process of adding this summer. It would formalize DOD's policy of encouraging scientific societies to hold restricted sessions (attendancegenerally limited to U.S. residents only) at their technical meetings for topics that might be straying into areas covered by export controls.
Continued
Actions Meet with Mixed Reviews
While, taken as a whole, these government measures do much to resolve confusion that has hovered over the scientific community since 1980 regarding what may be controlled, some confusion yet remains. And several recently articulated policies have created new concerns among scientists and research societies. For example, Robert Park believes that the growing tendency to make controls on the dissemination of research findings a contractually agreed-upon provision "should eliminate the insidious uncertainties that have been responsible for the 'chilling effect,' that leads to self-censorship." However, he adds, "Restrictions written into a contract are still restrictions and have the potential to retard our progress."
